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‘Great Georgians’
On 16 January 2009 Georgian Public TV broadcast a peculiar show. 
This was a TV format which — under different names — had run in many 
other countries. ‘Great Britons’ in the United Kingdom and ‘TheName Rus-
sia’ in Russia were the direct predecessors of the Georgian version of this TV 
show, which this time was entitled ‘TheGreat Ten’. Theaim of the show was 
to select, with the active participation of the audience, ten ‘great Georgians’ 
from history and to rank them according to their popularity. Theshow quick-
ly became very popular, but two months after its start the Georgian Orthodox 
Church declared that its format was unbecoming.
The reason for this protest was for many a real surprise. In the list of 
‘great Georgians’ there were many people who had in the past been canonized 
by the Church. Thesewere not clerics in the first instance, but kings, writers 
and public figu es whose authority had been earned exclusively through their 
secular activities. But, in the view of the Church, persons regarded as saints 
should not be subjected to a completion among each other. It was this com-
petition between the saints which the Church regarded as blasphemy. Only 
the active resistance of liberal circles saved the TV show from being discon-
tinued altogether. But still a fundamental change was made to its format: Ten 
‘great Georgians’ were selected in the end, but without ranking them against 
each other, that is, without defining the place of a particular person on this 
‘top ten’ list.
One should not consider this story as an exotic or insignificant 
episode; at least it was not regarded as such in Georgia. On the contrary, it 
became the centre of media attention and a hotly debated issue in the public 
sphere. The reason for this interest can be explained by the fact that the fate 
of the interpretation of national culture in Georgia was at stake. 
TheGeorgian Orthodox Church attempted to present its religious 
interpretation of the most important personalities of Georgian history and 
culture as the decisive one and to bar any other interpretation as illegitimate. 
Thus this debate touched upon questions of the form and function of 
nationalism in the country as well as on the role played by the Orthodox 
Church in forming nationalism.
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Three Forms of Nationalism: Ethnic, Civic, Revolutionary
A consistent narrative about the types and development of Georgian 
nationalism has appeared in Georgia during the last decade. This narrative 
tells us that during the first years of independence, ethnic nationalism domi-
nated the political and societal scene. This ethnic nationalism was particu-
laristic and exclusionist, based on principles of blood, kinship and descent. 
It was the major factor behind the ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (together with the mirroring minority ethnic nationalisms that 
developed in these breakaway regions). This ethnic nationalism had its ori-
gin, paradoxically enough, in the Soviet Union which, in parallel to the dec-
laration of internationalist principles, also offici ly and unoffici ly fostered 
a particular form of nationalism. One of the reasons for the fall of the Soviet 
Union, alongside its ailing economy, was its inability to contain this nation-
alism, especially on the periphery, such as the Caucasus.
According to this narrative, one of the major achievements of the pe-
riod after the November Revolution of 2003 was overcoming ethnic nation-
alism and developing its civic counterpart. The State, on the levels of both 
policy and officia discourse, stopped differentiating between its citizens ac-
cording to their ethnic background and elevated citizenship to the only prin-
ciple according to which it defined Georgian identity. Thiswas explicitly in-
terpreted by representatives of the new political elite as a major societal and 
political change, heralding not the overcoming of nationalism as such, but 
rather the establishment of its civic form, able to encompass representatives 
of all ethnic and religious communities inhabiting the country.
This classifi ation of two types of nationalism is certainly not a Geor-
gian invention. It goes back to as early as the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, to the works of the German author Friedrich Meinecke,1 who distin-
guished between Kulturnation and Staatsnation. This distinction later found 
many different forms while maintaining its kernel: Western and Eastern, 
ethnic and civic, cultural and political, subjective and objective nationalisms. 
As applied to post-Soviet space, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are considered to 
be the embodiments of civic nationalism, while in Estonia and Latvia ethnic 
nationalism is supposed to have dominance. This distinction has been often 
criticized because it marks all too overtly one side of the difference as positive 
and the other as negative. But the following question is an interesting one in 
the contemporary Georgian context:Is this distinction adequate enough to 
cover the intricacies of the development of Georgian nationalism since1990? 
Perhaps it could be shown that the empirical material presented to us by re-
cent Georgian history is far from being exhausted by this simple dichotomy, 
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and the narrative that is based on it cannot be taken as the last word on the 
history of nationalism in Georgia.
Without wanting to abandon this well-established distinction between 
the two forms of nationalism as such, I think that the Georgian experience 
of the last two decades demands the addition ofa third term designating a 
distinct type, the revolutionary one. This step has already been taken by Jack 
Snyder, who provided three different patterns of development of national-
ism. In his analysis, civic nationalism is exemplified by Britain, and ethnic 
nationalism by Serbia, whereas the revolutionary form of nationalism is best 
understood when looking at France at the end of the eighteenth century. This 
French revolutionary nationalism was by no means ethnic. ‘Citizenship was 
based on criteria of territorial residence and loyalty to French political prin-
ciples, not on language or the ethnic culture’. But, according to Snyder, it 
was not civic either. ‘The French varsion was collectivist, not individualist, 
and derived from participation in the community, not from individual 
liberties’. This emphasis on the liberty of the nation over the liberty of the 
individual is the trait that distinguishes revolutionary French nationalism 
from the civic British one. ‘Nationalism in France’, concludes Snyder, ‘took 
the revolution-ary form, basing its appeals for collective action on the 
defence of political revolution that had brought to power a regime that 
governed in the name of the nation, and violently opposing those who were 
seen as trying to undo the change’.2 When trying to find the reasons behind 
the rise of this revolutionary nationalism, it is the institutional vacuum, the 
absence of an effective institutional framework that is identified as the prime 
factor.In many ways this description fits the political situation in Georgia af-
ter the November Revolution of 2003.3 Confronted with a failing state un-
able to spread a monopoly of legitimate power on its territory and to provide 
citizens with basic services, the new government had to start an extensive 
state-building programme and to mobilize the people for this purpose. This 
is when revolutionary nationalism made its appearance, aimed at establish-
ing a novel kind of political identity and at protecting this identity from its 
enemies, both internal and external. It was interpreted as a civic form of na-
tionalism, but this interpretation required a certain measure of aberration to 
be accepted as such. This nationalism was not aiming to preserve some po-
litical identity which had already existed. On the contrary, it wanted to revo-
lutionize society by offering a new, more modern and dynamic interpretation 
of what it is to be Georgian in the twenty-first century. This was no longer 
based on ethnicity and emphasized the factor of citizenship as something 
defining the understanding of nationhood. In this regard it was inclusive, 
not exclusive. But this trait could not — and did not — take away its revolu-
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tionary character. Revolutionary nationalism creates its own exclusions with 
a heightened sense of friend-enemy distinctions. It is also hard to reconcile 
with liberal values, appealing directly to the masses, transforming and mould-
ing them into a new form.
Nationalism and Religion
But even with this correction of the dominant narrative and the re-
placement of ‘civic’ with ‘revolutionary’ nationalism, this framework can pro-
vide no explanation for the case described above; the conflict between the 
Church and liberal circles was not about ethnicity. It was the religious fac-
tor which played a decisive role in it, linked with the issue of the interpreta-
tion of the national cultural heritage. It was a question of the appropriation 
of Georgian culture by the Georgian Orthodox Church. How could this will 
to appropriate the whole of the culture come into existence? And what form 
doesthis will to appropriate take in Georgia?
If one argues that the dominant ethnic nationalism of the 1990s was 
first challenged and then changed on the level of officia discourse at the be-
ginning of twenty-first century by a revolutionary form of nationalism, this 
still does not cover the whole complexity of this field  The most important 
dimension of the phenomenon ignored by this narrative of a simple transi-
tion from ethnic to revolutionary nationalism is the religious one. It has been 
already noted that in post-Soviet Georgia the religious renaissance took a 
stronger and more vital form than in the other countries of the region, even 
those closest geographically, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan.4 One of the 
salient features of this religious renaissance has been its close link to Geor-
gian nationalism. The religious discourse is hard to differentiate from the 
nationalist discourse about the survival of the Georgian nation. Not only 
that: the kernel of the religious discourse in Georgia during the last two de-
cades — propagated both by the Georgian Orthodox Church and others — is 
the narrative about the survival of Georgian nationhood.
This is a remarkable development since Georgian nationalism devel-
oped in a thoroughly secular context in the middle of the nineteenth 
century.5 When analysing texts from the 1850s and 1860s where the project 
of Georgian nationalism was first articulated, one notices a complete 
absence of religious motives and themes. Theonly exception is when these 
themes are used metaphorically, but these metaphors are never taken very 
seriously. What is more, after a war with the Ottoman Empire the Muslim 
part of Georgia, when Ajara (lying in the southern part of the country by 
the Black Sea, on 
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the border with present-day Turkey) was incorporated into the Georgian ter-
ritories by the Russian Empire, the ideologues of Georgian nationalism were 
quite explicit in relativizing the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in 
the process of Georgian identity building. ‘In our opinion, neither the unity 
of language, nor the unity of religion and kinship can fuse the people with 
each other as the unity of history’ was the lesson drawn by the founder of 
Georgian nationalism,Ilia Chavchavadze, in 1877. It was precisely this 
secular nationalism which was decisive for the development of Georgian 
culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Without it, the cultural 
integration of the linguistically and religiously extremely diverse population 
of Georgia would have been far more difficul if not impossible.
In 1987 the Georgian Orthodox Church canonized Ilia Chavcha-
vadze. Thiswas regarded as a logical development of the burgeoning nation-
alism which was becoming stronger and stronger in the disintegrating Soviet 
Union. But this canonization could be considered as the beginning of anew 
and distinct form of religious nationalism7 in Georgia, which claims to con-
tinue the older, nineteenth-century form of nationalism, but in reality is in 
strong contrast with its secular kernel. In the eighties and at the beginning 
of the nineties it was the so-called National Movement which integrated el-
ements of explicit religious content into their form of ethnic nationalism. 
Messianistic expectations became the horizon for national identity building. 
The heritage of Orthodox Christianity was advanced as an essential factor 
for the formation of national self-awareness. But what is interesting at this 
early stage of the deployment of religious nationalism is the fact that it was 
by no means dominated by the institution of the Church. On the contrary, 
this new form of nationalistic ideology was advance by informal networks in 
civil society and by political actors who managed to come to power carried 
by the wave of national upheaval. It was only after the full disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, civil war and ethnic conflicts that the Georgian Orthodox 
Church started to become the institutional embodiment of this new form of 
nationalist ideology. But it came into its own only after the revolution of 2003 
and the spread of the new kind of revolutionary nationalism.
At first glance, the paradox of the situation lies in the fact that a re-
ligious nationalism appealing to the past, to the biologically understood es-
sence of national identity and to the story of its religious salvation, gained 
popularity after the revolution of 2003, that is, after the modernization proj-
ect had beenexplicitly endorsed by the political elite with its strong revolu-
tionary-nationalistic sentiments. But this paradox is only a superficial one. 
It is not difficult to see the rise of religious nationalism as a backlash 
against the modernization project with its new form of revolutionary 
nationalism.
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What are the distinctive features of this religious nationalism? It is an 
ideology which makes religious affiliation to Orthodoxy an essential factor 
in determining national identity. ‘Georgianness’ lies in ‘being Orthodox’. 
Reli-gious nationalism offers a sustained narrative telling the story of the 
survival of the Georgian nation in almost biologizing terminology grounded 
in theo-logical propositions. The kernel of this narrative is about Orthodoxy 
saving ‘Georgian blood’, ‘Georgian genes’, and Georgian identity as such.
Th ough this discourse religious minorities are excluded. Since reli-
gious and ethnic identities are very strongly linked through this discourse, 
the achievements of revolutionary nationalism with its stress on citizenship 
and integration are brought into question. According to the Georgian con-
stitution, Church and State are separate but, first y, the Church is the most 
trusted institution in the country and, secondly, most political parties tend 
to make the religious nationalist discourse their own, which makes its influ -
ence much stronger. Theconstitutional agreement between Church and State, 
which recognizes ‘the special role’ of the Orthodox Church in the history of 
Georgia, is an institutional source of this influence.7
Church and State
There were several reasons why the religious factor was not important 
in the development of nationalism in the nineteenth century.8 The Geor-
gian Orthodox Church had been in decline since the seventeenth century 
and the nationalist mobilization of Georgians within the Russian Empire 
concentrated on other institutions and issues, such as dynastic and territorial 
ones. It was also signifi ant that Orthodox Christianity was a factor through 
which occupied Georgia was brought closer to the occupying Russian Em-
pire rather than distanced from it. It was this relative weakness of the insti-
tution and the identity of the confession which gave the Russian Empire the 
possibility of abolishing the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
without many problems (whereas in Armenia, for example, the autonomy of 
the Church could be preserved). In many places Russian became the language 
of the liturgy, which increasedthe distance between the Georgian population 
and the Church.
Contemporary research has shown us that during Soviet times 
religious communities were not treated in homogenous ways by the State.9 
Following policies aimed at the elimination of religion in the twenties and 
thir-ties, the situation changed during the Second World War, when the 
Church was instrumentalized for mobilization purposes. But real 
revitalization of 
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the Church — both in Russia and Georgia — took place in the late seven-
ties, when all the other Soviet institutions controlled by the State gradually 
lost their authority. It was against this background that the Church started 
to gain prestige, which only grew with the rise of the national movement in 
the late eighties.
At present, tension between the two forms of nationalism has had 
an unexpected consequence. As each of these nationalisms is institutional-
ized — the State having officially adopted revolutionary nationalism, and 
the Orthodox Church having endorsed religious nationalism — there 
appears a tension, sometimes even a conflict between Church and State. 
Thisis unex-pected and surprising, since there is no tradition of this kind of 
conflict in Georgia, and the Byzantine idea of ‘symphonia’ between the 
secular and the sacred instances of power, whatever its actual 
implementation, is still consid-ered to be normative within the Orthodox 
Church. This can be clearly seen in the example of the Russian Orthodox 
Church which, after the fall of the USSR, developed in the direction of 
merging with State interests.10 Much the same development occurred in 
Georgia in the nineties and at the beginning of the new millennium, but 
everything has radically changed since the Revolution of 2003. On the 
surface, on the level of ceremonies and discourse, the unity of the Georgian 
Church and the Georgian State seems to be intact. But hidden tensions 
seem to accompany this relationship, sometimes turning into open conflicts. 
There is a very interesting case of conflict between the government 
and the Church which was closely related to determining the question of 
what is Georgian national culture and who has the right to dispose of it. A 
number of Georgian monuments on Turkish territory are in urgent need of 
restora-tion. In exchange for the right to restore these monuments, the 
Government of Turkey is asking the Georgian government to restore and/
or reconstruct four mosques on Georgian territory. Thisrequires an 
agreement to be signed between the Georgian and Turkish governments. A 
draft of this agreement was already ready in 2007, but the Georgian 
Orthodox Church opposed its signature. The Georgian government, 
finding itself in a difficul situation be-cause of opposition protests, decided 
not to go against the Church and did not make the issue the subject of a 
public debate. But this tension turned into a conflict when the Government 
tried to push again for the signing of the agreement in 2011. In this case 
also, it is a question of defining how to understand national culture and 
national identity. For the Georgian Orthodox Church, the medieval 
monuments on Turkish territory are of no direct interest, since even after 
restoration they will have only a cultural, not a reli-gious function. As for 
the State, it is confronted with the task of preserving 
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the cultural heritage of the country. These two perspectives produce two dif-
ferent discourses, both of which are strongly nationalist, but they clearly dif-
fer from each other.
One could interpret this as a process of re-traditionalization going 
against — but also in parallel to — the project and process of modernization. 
If the modernization project with its revolutionary nationalism can be inter-
preted as an attempt by the political system to transform the whole of soci-
ety, then the re-traditionalization process with the religious nationalism that 
accompanies it can be viewed as an attempt to impose religious semantics 
on the totality of societal and cultural phenomena. Being a form of nation-
alism — a modern phenomenon par excellence — religious nationalism would 
like to become the locus of resistance to modernity. Thisis its major problem: 
It cannot allow itself to be seen as it is, it can only exist on condition that it 
obscures and conceals its modern character, refers to an imaginary past, and 
blocks an understanding of the fundamental contingency of the social order.
Notes
1. 
2.  
Cf. Brubaker, Rogers: The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction 
between ‘Civic’ and ‘Ethnic’ Nationalism’. In: Kriesi, Hanspeter; Armin-
geon, Klaus; Siegrist, Hannes (Hg.): Nation and National Identity. The 
European Experience in Perspective. 1999, pp. 55-72. [A different 
version of the present article was published in German as
“Nationalismus und Religion in Georgien”, in: G2W, (2011) 6, 16–19]. 
Snyder, Jack: From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist 
Conflict. 2000, p. 156.
3.  Cf. Wheatley, Jonathan: Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revo-
lution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Ashgate Pub. 2005.
4. See Charles, Robia: Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions: Tales
from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), in: Politics
and Religion 2010, 1-34.
5.. Reisner, Oliver: Die Schule der georgischen Nation. Eine sozialhistorische
Untersuchung der nationalen Bewegung in Georgien am Beispiel der ‘Ge-
sellschaft zur Verbreitung der Lese- und Schreibkunde unter den Geor-
giern’ (1850-1917) (= Kaukasienstudien, Band 6). Wiesbaden2004;
128
Giga Zedania
6. For the analysis of the rise of religious nationalism worldwide during the
last decades, see Juergensmeyer, Mark: The New Cold War? Religious Na-
tionalism Confronts the Secular State, Berekely, Los Angeles 1993;
7. Abashidze,Levan: Das Recht der Religionsgemeinschaften in Georgien. In: 
Lienemann, Wolfgang; Reuter, Hans-Richard (Hg.): Das Recht der Reli-
gionsgemeinschaften inMittel-, Ost- und Südeuropa.Baden-Baden 2005,
S. 191-206.
8. Cf. Jones, Stephen F.: Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Georgia and Ar-
menia. In: Ramet, Pedro (ed.): Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East
European Politics. Durham 1989, S. 171-195; Grdzelidze Tamara; George, 
Martin; Vischer, Lukas (ed.): Witness Th ough Troubled Times: A Histo-
ry of the Orthodox Church of Georgia, 1811to the Present. London 2006.
9.  Cf. Ramet, Sabrina P.: Nihil Obstat. Religion, Politics, and Social Change
in East-Central Europe and Russia. Duke University Press, 1998.
10`. Cf. Knox, Zoe: Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in
Russia after Communism. London 2005.
